ABSTRACT In this paper, a new class of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) on contingency analysis (CA) through state estimation (SE) is proposed, and the economic impact of the proposed attacks on real-time power market operations is quantified. Compared with the existing FDIAs, where no contingency analysis is considered for attack targets, we present a new attack strategy with which the adversary stealthily drops or adds contingency pairs of transmission line flows from or to a normal contingency list by misleading the CA process through injecting false data into SE. The manipulated contingency pairs are then embedded as security constraints into operating constraints of security-constrained economic dispatch. As a result, the proposed attacks lead to the miscalculation of locational marginal price (LMP) in real-time power markets. The capability and economic impact of the proposed attack, such as a list of manipulated contingency line pairs, attack effort, and LMP deviation from normal price, are illustrated in the IEEE 14-bus system.
I. INTRODUCTION
For reliable power grid operations, system operators focus on maintaining power grid physical security that is the ability of power grids to withstand sudden disturbances such as natural disasters [1] . However, as emerging smart grid technologies rely more on information and communication technology (ICT), power grids are more vulnerable to cyber attacks through ICT systems. Recently, the 2015 Ukraine blackout [2] was the first cyber attack against electric power systems by compromising ICT networks and components, leading to blackouts in three Ukrainian regions. Therefore, enhancing cybersecurity is also increasingly critical in managing power grid operations more reliably and securely [3] . This study investigates the impact of cyber attacks on physical security and cybersecurity of smart grid.
In power system operations, on-line physical security assessment can be conducted with the following three major functions: (1) state estimation (SE); (2) contingency analysis (CA); and (3) security-constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF). The goal of SE is to process data (e.g., power injection/flow, bus voltage magnitude, and on/off status of circuit breaker) from a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, to calculate the best estimate of the power system's state, and to construct real-time network models based on the estimate [4] . The constructed real-time network models are then used by CA module, identifying overloads due to potential contingencies such as generator or transmission line failure. In general, CA is conducted based on DC or AC power flow method and consists of static CA and dynamic CA, corresponding to: (a) line overflow and bus overvoltage; and (b) voltage stability. In this paper, static CA using DC power flow analysis is considered since static CA is more tightly coupled with SE than dynamic CA. Finally, CA calculates a list of line or generator contingencies, namely contingency list with which the SCOPF module redispatches optimal power of generators for preventing potential contingency violations [5] . Due to computation complexity in real-time power market operations, a linearized line flow-based security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED) is conducted, which is a simplified formulation of SCOPF based on DC assumptions [6] . In this paper, we consider the proposed attack problem in the procedure of on-line power system security assessment as shown in Fig. 1 . This figure illustrates the relationship among SCADA telemetry, SE, CA in cyber layer, and SCED in market layer, along with the following information flow (solid black line): normal SCADA data ⇒ SE ⇒ CA ⇒ SCED. It should be noted that the performance of the physical security process above highly depends on the accuracy of SE results that are calculated based on measurements from many SCADA sensors (e.g., remote terminal unit (RTU)). Therefore, compromising sensors by injecting malicious data into SE measurements could have catastrophic impact on CA and SCED solutions sequentially. This type of cyber data attack against SE is known as a false data injection attack (FDIA). This paper contributes to the following two aspects: (1) the proposal for a new class of FDIA strategies with which the adversary manipulates normal contingency list from CA through the malfunction of the SE process; and (2) economic impact analysis of SCED subject to the proposed attacks, as shown in Fig. 1 (dotted red line) .
Recently, much research has focused on the development of FDIA strategies and the quantification of their impact on physical and economic grid operations. This ranges from the formulation of the attack against DC state estimator [7] (a pioneering work on FDIA problem in power grid) and AC state estimator [8] - [10] with impact analysis of attacks, network topology attack through the manipulation of circuit breaker's on/off status data [11] - [16] , blind FDIA attack without the knowledge of network topology using the principal component analysis [17] , imperfect false data injection based on forecasting-aided method [18] , attack automatic generation control (AGC) attack [19] , and economic assessment of the attack on virtual transactions [20] and real-time power market operations [21] . More recently, it has been justified that these previous studies above are theoretical examinations no longer and actual FDIA attacks would become feasible in real power grids [22] .
While many studies have addressed the feasibility of FDIAs and evaluated the vulnerability of power grids to such attacks, various methods for detecting and identifying FDIA have been proposed to mitigate detrimental impact of FDIA on power grid operations. In [23] , the least-budget depending method against FDI attack was presented wherein the selection of securely protected sensors was solved by a mixed integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) problem based on Bender's decomposition. Using cluster algorithm, vulnerable buses and sensitive SCADA measurements to FDIA were classified and identified, leading to effective FDIA detection [24] . A new framework to detect FDIAs against DC microgrids was proposed in [25] . In [26] , short-term state forecasting-aided method was presented where the consistency between the forecasted measurements and the received measurements are checked to identify false data in critical measurements. A sequential detection problem of FDIAs was addressed and a sequential detector based on the generalized likelihood ratio was proposed to quickly detect FDIAs in [27] . More recently, machine learning technique was used to easily detect FDIA for classifying measurements into nonattack events (e.g., natural contingency and operator's control action) and attack events by using: temporal characteristics of FDIA using Conditional Deep Belief Network (CDBN) [28] , semisupervised online learning method [29] , and non-nested generalized exemplars (NNGE) through pre-processing of the state extraction method (STEM) [30] . A concise review of various FDIA strategies and defending methods in smart grid is summarized in [31] and [32] .
Although extensive research has been conducted on the subject of FDIA problems, to the best of our knowledge, no study has proposed FDIAs on CA and quantified the economic impact of such attacks on real-time market operations. Recently, the method of FDIA on static security analysis and its impact on market operations were studied in [33] . However, no detailed algorithm of CA was considered in the attack method, and the impact analysis of real-time electricity prices subject to such attack was excluded.
In this paper, a new class of optimization-based FDIAs is presented considering static CA, and the economic impact of such attacks on real-time LMP is assessed. The main contributions of this paper are two-fold: 1) We propose two types of FDIAs on CA. The adversary stealthily drops or adds contingency pairs of transmission line flows from or to a normal contingency list by misleading the CA process through injecting false data into SE while being undetected by bad data detection (BDD) embedded in the state estimator. We model a least-effort attack as a mixed integer nonlinear programming (MINLP)-based optimization problem. The goal of the formulated optimization problem is to minimize the number of compromised analog and digital sensors to manipulate targeted contingency pairs successfully.
2) We evaluate the performance of the proposed attacks in terms of: i) the targeted dropped or added contingency pairs; ii) the manipulated analog and digital measurements; and iii) attack effort (i.e., a maximum number of compromised sensors). In addition, we investigate the impact of the manipulated contingency list due to attacks on real-time LMP that is calculated by SCED. Various case studies including the quantification of the attack performance and its economic impact on LMP are illustrated in the IEEE 14-bus system. This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the brief overview of SE, CA, and real-time SCED. The proposed optimization-based attack strategies are formulated in Section III. Case studies of the proposed attacks are presented in the IEEE 14-bus system in Section IV. Finally, conclusions and future studies are discussed in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND A. STATE ESTIMATION (SE)
Assuming that N b is the number of buses, N l is the number of lines, and N m is the number of measurements, we consider the linearized DC state estimation model: The SE problem is to find the optimal estimate of x to minimize the weighted least square of measurement error:
where r is the estimated residual vector. If the Jacobian matrix H is full rank (i.e., the system is observable), the unique weighted least squares estimate of x is given bŷ
During the state estimation process, the bad data detection is conducted using the Chi-squares test based on the estimated objective function J (x). Since J (x) follows a Chi-square distribution with N m − (N b − 1) degrees of freedom, bad data will be suspected if
where p is the detection confidence probability.
B. CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS (CA)
CA is an application to enable power systems to operate defensively in case of unplanned and/or unscheduled failure events such as transmission line outage and generator failure. In general, CA consists of two main components: (1) contingency selection [34] - [36] ; and (2) contingency evaluation [37] , [38] . The goal of contingency selection is to reduce the computation burden of subsequent contingency evaluation process by making a short list of all the contingencies, namely mon-con pairs (a pair of monitored line/generator and their corresponding contingency). Based on the short contingency list from contingency selection, contingency evaluation is to check operating violations of all lines and generating units for each contingency and to finally construct a contingency list, a subset of mon-con pairs [6] . In particular, the contingency list to transmission line flows can be quickly calculated using the following equation (5) based on DC power flow analysis method:
where
In (5), MC represents the set of mon-con pairs (u, k) from contingency selection. In sum, Fig. 2 illustrates the procedure of the CA. It is noted that the CA process initiates with the solution of state estimator. In this figure, (5) is used to conduct contingency evaluation where F u,k is compared with corresponding maximum or minimum capacity limit of line flow, consequently constructing the contingency table with contingency pairs for line overloads. Those contingency pairs are then embedded as inequality constraints into the system operating constraints of SCED, which is illustrated in the next subsection. 
C. REAL-TIME SECURITY-CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC DISPATCH (SCED)
In real-time markets, SCED is formulated as follows [6] :
s.t. λ :
In this formulation, the objective function is to minimize the total generation costs in (8) . (9) is the system-wide energy balance equation. (10) is the physical capacity constraints of each generator. (11) is the network flow constraints without considering line outage where S l represents the lth row of the GSF matrix S. (12) is the security constraints that are the results of contingency evaluation as mentioned in the previous subsection. In (12) , u is the uth row of the matrix
The elements in the matrix are called as the compensated generation shift sensitivities, providing the sensitivity of line u with respect to change in net injection at any bus when line k outage occurs. It is noted that the constraints (12) are defined as the security constraints, which are the result of the contingency pairs from CA. According to the definition of the nodal price, and assuming that bus 1 is the slack bus, locational marginal price (LMP) for each bus n (i = 2, . . . , N ) is given by
where λ, µ max , µ min , µ max s and µ min s are the Lagrangian multipliers of equality and inequality constraints in the SCED formula. λ is the LMP for the slack bus 1. {µ max , µ min } and {µ max s , µ min s } correspond to congestion prices when line flows are binding at network flow constraints and security constraints, respectively.
III. ATTACK FORMULATION A. ATTACK MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In the proposed attack, the adversary is required to have the following capabilities: (R1) The adversary has the knowledge of system topology including the status of circuit breakers and each line's parameter/limits. (R2) The adversary can compromise SCADA sensors by observing and manipulating measurements. (R3) Given manipulated measurements, the adversary can conduct SE and BDD to calculate desired line flow estimate while being undetected by BDD process. (R4) Prior to the attack, the adversary can conduct CA to obtain the contingency list. The targeted contingency pairs are dropped or added to the attack-free contingency LIST. To this end, using the manipulated line flow estimate in (R3) the adversary must be able to calculate new line flow estimates considering contingencies. In [22] , the authors have justified that the aforementioned assumptions are reasonable and FDIAs can be feasible by: (i) using off-line or on-line measurements to estimate the system topology (R1); (ii) injecting malicious data into sensors through an insecure SCADA communication protocol (R2); and (iii) understanding architecture and algorithms of power system applications such as SE, CA, and BDD from textbooks and research publications (R3), (R4).
In this study, we consider the additive attack measurement model:
where α and β are the attack vectors for analog and digital measurements, leading to corrupted measurement vector z a . Using the attack measurement model (14) , the proposed attack strategies are illustrated in the following two subsections.
B. ATTACK STRATEGY I
We assume that any line l can belong to one of the three types of lines {u, k, t}: line u is the monitored line, line t is the targeted line, and line k is the untargeted line. The superscript a of variable, vector, and matrix indicates that they are changed by the attack vector. CP and CP represent the set of contingency and non-contingency pairs, respectively. The goal of attack strategy I is to drop targeted contingency pairs (u, t) ∈ CP from an attack-free contingency table with minimum attack effort, while keeping untargeted contingency pairs (u, k) belonging to a set of non-contingency pairs ∈ CP as well as bypassing the BDD module.
To this end, the adversary computes malicious injected analog and discrete attack measurement vectors (α, β) by 
The objective function (15) for the attack optimization problem above is defined as the attack effort that consists in the two l 0 -norms of the attack vectors (α, β), corresponding to a maximum number of compromised analog sensors for power injection/flow measurements and digital sensors for status of open/closed lines, respectively. Constraints (16) and (17) represent the attack measurement equations associated with analog and discrete measurement manipulation, respectively. Constraint (18) illustrates the relationship between the fully connected line-to-bus incidence matrix (A f ) T and the attack matrix (A a ) T due to manipulated digital measurements c a . Undetectability of the attack can be ensured by escaping the BDD module in constraint (19) . Constraint (20) is the equation for power flow F a l at line l, manipulated by the adversary through malicious change of analog and digital measurements. Using the LODF matrix ϒ a modified by the adversary, flows on line u subject to line k outage ∈ CP and line t outage ∈ CP are computed in (21) and (22), respectively. While non-contingency pairs before the attack remain secure line pairs after the attack in (23), constraint (24) guarantees the drop of targeted contingency pairs (u, t) from the contingency table, consequently misleading the CA module to select them as insecure line pairs.
C. ATTACK STRATEGY II
In attack strategy II, the adversary computes the attack measurement vectors (α, β) in the following optimization problem:
Eqn.
Compared to attack strategy I where the adversary reduces the size of contingency table, attack strategy II focuses on increasing the number of contingency pairs by adding targeted non-contingency pairs to the contingency table. The objective function (15) and constraints (16)- (20) for measurement manipulation, calculation of estimated line flows, and undetectable condition in the attack I formulation are added to the attack II formulation. When there is no contingency at all, overloading of all lines due to the attack can be escaped in (27) where
] T . Constraints (28) and (29) represent the flow on line u when outage occurs at untargeted line k and targeted line t, belonging to sets of contingency pairs and non-contingency pairs, respectively. The list of contingency pairs including untargeted lines before the attack can remain insecure pairs after the attack in (30) . Conversely, constraint (31) ensures that targeted non-contingency pairs before the attack are changed to contingency pairs with increasing size of the contingency table.
Finally, Fig. 3 illustrates the procedure of the proposed attacks I and II among SCADA, SE, CA, and SCED along with corresponding to subsections. 
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we investigate the performance of the proposed attack and evaluate the economic impact of such attack on real-time LMP in IEEE 14-bus system, shown in Fig. 4 . For the illustration of line-adding topology data attack, the IEEE 14-bus system is slightly modified with additional lines 21 and 22. System data for the modified IEEE 14-bus system are taken from MATPOWER 4.0 IEEE 14-bus test case file and provided in Appendix. For all lines, capacity limits of all power flows are set to 200 MW. We assume that all measurements have been complete; real power injection P m i and flow measurement F m l are assigned to each bus i and the one end of each line l. We assume that all the real power flow and injection measurements are corrupted by additive Gaussian noises with equal variances σ 2 = 0.0001. The measurement redundancy (i.e., the ratio of the number of measurements to the number of state variables) is 36/13. For BDD, the threshold η of the Chi-squares test with a 95% confidence level is set to 35.17. Numerical testing is performed with the optimization toolbox in MATLAB R2015b (IntelCore i5 CPU clocking at 3.50 GHz, with 4 GB of RAM). Table 1 shows the generator parameters in the IEEE 14-bus system where a i and b i are linear and quadratic cost coefficients for generator i.
The test scenarios for the proposed attack I and attack II are categorized into two groups, corresponding to three different cases in each group, as follows: (G1) Cases 1, 2, and 3 (Attack I) (G2) Cases 4, 5, and 6 (Attack II) Case 1 and Case 4 are base cases in each group where the attack becomes more severe due to an increasing number of manipulated contingency pairs from Case 1 to Case 3 in (G1) and from Case 4 to Case 6 in (G2). Table 2 shows a list of normal contingency pairs (u, k) ∈ CP, which are calculated according to the CA procedure in Fig. 2 in subsection II-B . In our simulation, those contingency pairs are fed to the SCED module of which lines 5 and 13 associated with CP 1 and CP 4 are binding at their flow limits. Along with the results from Table 2 , the aforementioned line binding status provides a performance benchmark to compare the performance of the proposed attacks.
A. PERFORMANCE AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ATTACK I
In this subsection, Cases 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the attack I method with which the adversary stealthily drops targeted contingency pairs from the normal contingency list in Table 2 . Table 3 summarizes the performance of attack I for the three cases. The second row of Table 3 provides targeted contingency pairs to be dropped from the contingency table. The manipulated analog and digital SCADA measurements that yield incorrect SE solution are shown in the third row of Table 3 . The fourth and fifth rows reveal abnormal contingency pairs and binding condition due to malfunction of CA and SCED, respectively. The last row of Table 3 reveals the attack effort that is a maximum number of compromised sensors. We can observe from this table that as the number of compromised sensors increases for dropping more contingency pairs from Case 1 to Case 3, CA yields a decreasing number of contingency pairs, leading to a decreasing number of binding flow constraints in SCED. This observation implies that through the drop of more contingency pairs the adversary could mislead system operators into believing the current system operating conditions are more secure physically and economically even though they are actually insecure. Fig. 5 shows the comparison of the LMPs between without attack and with attack in Cases 1, 2, and 3. In case of without attack, we observe that LMPs at buses that are connected to lines of binding contingency pairs reveal a relatively larger price gap with each other. For example, in the two binding contingency pairs, CP 1 and CP 4 , buses 1, 2, and 5 are connected to the ends of lines 2 and 5 belonging to CP 1 , and buses 6, 12, and 13 to the ends of lines 12 and 13 belonging to CP 4 . We can observe from Fig. 5 that LMPs at buses 5, 12, and 13 (power import region) become maximum whereas LMPs at buses 1, 2, and 6 (power export region) become minimum. This observation holds true in Cases 1, 2, and 3 as well. In Case 1, buses 4, 7, and 9, and buses 2, 5 are connected to the end of lines belonging to the binding CP 2 and CP 6 , and to the end of line belonging to network flow F 5 . As expected, bus 7 at power import region and bus 2 at power export region have maximum and minimum values of LMP, respectively. Another observation is that Case 1 attack results in almost uniform LMPs at buses 6, 12, and 13 compared to the LMPs without attack. This result derives from the fact that binding CP 4 corresponding to lines 12 and 13 is dropped from normal contingency list by the adversary and hence there is no network flow congestion at lines 12 and 13. In addition, buses 1 and 12 show the largest price gap between with and without attack. It is noted that those buses are connected to the ends of line 21, which is added by the adversary while being undetected by BDD. We can conjecture from this observation that network topology change has a significantly detrimental impact on the calculation of LMP.
In Case 2, the adversary drops more contingency pairs than in Case 1, consequently leading to only a binding flow constraint at F max 5 . As a result, LMPs at buses 7 and 8 in Case 2 become less and uniform than in Case 1. This is because those buses are connected to the ends of lines belonging to dropped CP 2 and CP 6 . Conversely, the highest and the lowest price are obtained at buses 5 and 2, corresponding to binding flow constraint at F max 5 . Finally, in Case 3 the adversary drops all contingency pairs, and all security and network flow constraints become unbinding in SCED. Due to no line congestion, prices in Fig. 5 denote uniform LMPs for all buses. It should be noted that Case 3 includes line-deleting attack. Unlike expectation that line-deleting attack increases the list of contingency pairs by making system operating condition become more insecure, our simulation result shows that the coordinated topology data attack through deletion and addition of lines decreases the list of contingency pairs, subsequently leading to less binding constraints at SCED.
B. PERFORMANCE AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ATTACK II
In this subsection, the performance of attack II is assessed in Cases 4, 5, and 6 where the adversary stealthily adds the targeted contingency pairs to the normal contingency list in Table 2 . Table 4 shows the performance of attack II for these three cases. The targeted contingency pairs (CP 8 ∼ CP 15 ) that are added to the normal contingency list are shown in Table 5 .
We observe from Table 4 that the number of contingency pairs (the fourth row) from CA and the number of the binding flow constraints (the fifth row) from SCED increase as long as attack effort (the sixth row) increases with an increasing number of the manipulated data (the third row) to enlarge the contingency table (the second row). Different from attack I including line-adding attack, all three cases in attack II include line-deleting attack where line 7 is removed after the attack. We can conclude from the results in Table 4 that line-deleting attack causes CA to calculate a more number of contingency pairs, consequently resulting in more VOLUME 6, 2018 binding flow constraints in SCED. Therefore, the adversary using the attack II strategy could mislead system operators to make a wrong decision that the current system operating condition appears to becomes more insecure physically and economically. Fig. 6 shows the comparison of the LMPs between without attack and with attack in Cases 4, 5, and 6. Compared to the results in Fig. 5 for attack I, it is observed from Fig. 6 that attack II yields more fluctuating prices at all buses. This observation results from the fact that the increase of the number of contingency pairs due to the malfunction of CA leads to the increase of the number of the binding flow constraints in SCED, consequently resulting in a larger gap between LMPs. Like the result from attack I, bus with maximum or minimum LMP due to attack II is in the ends of binding contingency pairs. For Cases 4, 5, and 6, pair of buses with the maximum and minimum LMP is summarized as follows: {bus 12 ∈ CP 4 , bus 1 ∈ CP 1 } in Case 4, {bus 12 ∈ CP 4 , bus 3 ∈ CP 11 } in Case 5 , and {bus 14 ∈ CP 13 , bus 3 ∈ CP 11 } in Case 6. Fig. 7 compares the average of LMP differences at all buses between with and without attack and the attack efforts for all six cases. We first observe from this figure that attack I (Cases 1, 2, and 3) and attack II (Cases 4, 5, and 6) distort prices more significantly as the adversary compromises more sensors. Another observation is that as the attack effort in each attack strategy increases, attack I leads to negative LMP deviation from LMP without attack, whereas attack II to a positive LMP deviation. This observation is due to the fact that the adversary using the attack I strategy reduces the number of contingency pairs from CA and binding flow constraints of SCED, consequently causing the network flow become less congested with lower as well as less fluctuating LMPs on average than without attack. Conversely, attack II causes network flow to become more congested and yields higher as well as more fluctuating LMPs on average than without attack. On the other hand, the proposed attacks I and II in subsections III-B and III-C could manipulate not only targeted contingency pairs but also additional undesirable contingency pairs. For example, Case 1 and Case 4 attacks aim to drop CP 1 and add CP 8 from and to a contingency list, respectively. However, the results from Tables 3 and 4 show that CP 4 in addition to CP 1 is dropped in Case 1, and CP 9 and CP 10 in addition to CP 8 are added. To guarantee that only targeted contingency pairs are manipulated, the following attack constraints can be added to the proposed optimization formulation for attacks I and II:
where the subscripts ex and ex represent the indices of untargeted lines in the contingency list and the non-contingency list, respectively. Table 6 shows the impact of two constraints (32) and (33) on the performance of the proposed attacks when CP 3 and CP 13 are dropped and added by the attacker, respectively. It is noted that the last column of Table 6 indicates contingency pairs that are untargeted, however additionally dropped or added by the attack. We can observe from this table that the attack method with (32) or (33) requires more attack effort while the attacker manipulates only targeted contingency pair successfully. Figs. 8 show the comparison of the LMPs between the proposed attack and the proposed attack with constraints (32) and (33) . We can observe from these figures that an increasing number of contingency pairs due to attack leads to higher LMPs with more fluctuating prices at all buses. This observation is also verified in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 . Therefore, we conclude that more (less) contingency pairs due to the attack has more (less) detrimental impact on the prices.
Finally, the meaningful observations from simulation studies of the proposed attack I and II can be summarized as follows.
1) In attack I and II, the adversary could stealthily distort the list of normal contingency pairs more severely at the cost of more manipulated sensor measurements. In general, the adversary using the strategy of attack I (attack II) executes the line-adding (deleting) attack to drop (add) targeted contingency pairs from (to) the normal contingency list. In addition to a simple topology data attack, a coordinated attack that consists in lineadding and line-deleting attacks can be conducted to aggravate the result of CA more as shown in Case 3. 2) Given tight coupling between CA and SCED, the manipulated contingency list due to the proposed attacks leads to an incorrect calculation of LMP from SCED. A significant distortion of LMP is observed at buses that are connected to the end of changed security constraint lines due to manipulated contingency pairs and the attacked topology line. Furthermore, attack I (attack II) decreases (increases) the average of LMPs for all the buses with less (more) fluctuating LMPs. Therefore, attack I and II could provide consumers and generation companies with additional profit, respectively.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed novel false data injection attacks on contingency analysis in real-time power system operations. We have formulated an undetectable least-effort attack as an optimization problem where the adversary could manipulate a number of contingency pairs obtained from contingency analysis by distorting the state estimation solution through injecting malicious data into SCADA measurements. Furthermore, we have assessed the economic impact of the proposed attacks on electricity prices that are calculated by security constrained economic dispatch in real-time power markets. This is the first study to characterize cyber data attacks against contingency analysis and investigate the vulnerability of real-time electricity prices to such attacks. In future studies, a broader range of cyber data attack methods will be developed in large-scale realistic power systems considering more practical applications in energy management system, such as AC state estimation and dynamic contingency analysis. Another interesting future study is to present a profitable attack strategy with which the adversary makes a financial gain through the malfunction of contingency analysis.
APPENDIX DATA FOR IEEE 14-BUS TEST SYSTEM
Simulation data for the test system are provided in Tables 7 and 8 . 
